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1. Introduction	
Intellectual	property	 rights	 (IPRs)	and	trade	agreements	go	a	 long	way	back.	But	 it	was	not	before	the	
conclusion	 of	 the	 multilateral	 negotiations	 that	 created	 the	World	 Trade	 Organization	 (WTO)	 and	 its	
covered	 agreements,	 when	 IPRs	 made	 the	 news.	 The	 WTO	 devoted	 a	 specific	 agreement	 on	 IPRs	
embedded	in	a	larger	market	access	philosophy	and	back	by	a	dispute	settlement	system	with	teeth:	The	
Agreement	on	Trade-Related	Aspects	of	Intellectual	Property	Rights	(TRIPS).	Trade	experts	saw	the	TRIPS	
agreement	 as	 one	 of	 the	main	 outcomes	 and	 pillars	 of	 the	 new	 organization.	 The	 protection	 of	 IPRs,	
however,	was	heavily	contested	both	during	the	negotiations	and	in	the	aftermath	of	the	WTO	creation.	
In	this	particular	regulatory	area,	least-developed	countries	(LDCs)	have	been	granted	a	transitional	opt-
out	 from	 the	 treaty	 obligations,	 a	 flexibility	 provision	 which	 has	 been	 prolonged	 to	 at	 least	 2021.	
Criticism,	however,	was	also	voiced	by	a	number	of	emerging	economies	that	lamented	an	overtly	strict	
IPR	regime.	In	2001	the	Doha	Declaration	to	launch	a	new	trade	round	(the	Doha	Development	Agenda)	
could	only	be	adopted	by	consensus	after	heated	debates	and	difficult	negotiations	to	allow	the	TRIPS	
agreement	to	be	derogated	for	national	public	health	objectives.	
The	protection	of	IPRs	has	remained	a	contested	matter	in	recent	years.	Civil	society	groups,	in	particular	
in	 Europe,	 have	 been	 campaigning	 against	 too	 stringent	 protection.	 They	 pushed	 for	 the	 European	
Parliament	 to	 block	 the	 ratification	 of	 the	Anti-Counterfeiting	 Trade	Agreement	 (ACTA)	 in	 2012	 by	 an	
overwhelming	 majority	 (478	 to	 39	 with	 165	 abstentions).	 This	 ended	 (for	 now)	 the	 project	 of	 a	
plurilateral	 agreement	 among	 some	 of	 the	 leading	 exporters	 of	 patent	 and	 trademark	 protected	
products.	The	most	recent	mega-regional	trade	agreements	such	as	the	Trans-Pacific	Partnership	(TPP)	
which	 has	 been	 strongly	 advocated	 by	 the	 US,	 move	 toward	 higher	 levels	 of	 protection	 granted	 for	
trademarks,	copy	rights	and	other	areas	of	IPR,	building	heavily	on	ACTA	and	US	IPR	law.	
This	paper	takes	a	systematic	approach	to	IPRs	in	trade	agreements	and	aims	to	take	stock	of	IPR-related	
provisions	 in	 preferential	 trade	 agreements	 (PTAs).	 For	 this	 purpose,	 we	 first	 discuss	 the	 literature	
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regarding	 the	 role	 of	 IPRs	 before	 providing	 new	 descriptive	 statistics	 on	 their	 inclusion	 in	 trade	
agreements.	 Based	on	 the	DESTA	database	 (Dür	 et	 al.	 2014),	we	present	 our	 conceptualization	of	 IPR	
content	in	PTAs	and	provide	the	most	systematic	mapping	done	so	far.	The	data	shows	in	particular	that	
agreements	with	 participation	 of	 the	US	 and	North-South	 agreement	 are	 the	most	 ambitious,	 feature	
specific	enforcement	mechanisms,	but	are	also	strongly	tied	to	the	multilateral	IP	regime.	This	confirms	
largely	conventional	wisdom.	The	paper	ends	with	outlining	the	next	steps	of	this	research	project.		
	
2. Debates	on	IPRs	and	Trade	Agreements	
The	economic	literature	on	the	role	of	stringent	IPRs	in	attracting	trade,	investment	and	technology	is	far	
from	conclusive	(Fink	and	Maskus	2005;	Maskus	2005).	As	a	consequence,	the	need	for	including	IPRs	in	
trade	 agreements	 is	 also	 contested	 (see	Maskus	 2000).	Nevertheless,	 international	 treaties	 to	 protect	
IPRs	 in	 foreign	markets	have	been	around	 for	a	 long	 time.	The	19th	 century	witnessed	 the	elaboration	
and	 conclusion	 of	 a	 set	 of	 specific	 bilateral	 and	 plurilateral	 agreements	 to	 protect	 copyright,	 artistic	
work,	 etc.	 These	 agreements	 later	 in	 the	 20th	 century	were	 bundled	 and	 administrated	 by	 the	World	
Intellectual	Property	Rights	Organization	(WIPO)	through	a	multilateral	setting	(see	Cottier	et	al.	2015).	
The	adherents	to	these	treaties	were	mainly	industrialized	countries	at	the	time.		
The	 debate	 increasingly	 politicized	 when	 IPR	 protection	 became	 a	 prominent	 feature	 in	 trade	
agreements	in	the	late	1980s,	illustrated	by	significant	IPR	obligations	in	the	North	American	Free	Trade	
Agreement	 (NAFTA)	 treaty.	 But	more	 importantly,	 IPRs	moved	 center	 stage	 in	 the	multilateral	 trading	
system	in	the	context	of	the	Uruguay	Round	leading	to	the	TRIPS	agreement.	The	debate	on	the	optimal	
balance	protecting	 legitimate	concerns	by	the	holder	of	 IPR	rights	and	allowing	for	ongoing	 innovation	
was	outstripped	by	developing	countries	contesting	the	concept	of	IPR,	while	developed	countries	seeing	
IPRs	 as	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 foreign	 direct	 investment	 (FDI)	 and	 technology	 transfer.	 Developed	
countries	finally	accepted	the	inclusion	of	IPRs	as	part	of	a	grand	bargain	which	provided	opportunities	
for	better	market	access	in	textiles	and	agricultural	goods	(Ostry	2002).	
One	of	the	effects	of	the	creation	of	the	WTO	and	its	strong	dispute	settlement	system	was	the	growing	
importance	of	WIPO	agreements	by	both	transplanting	legal	language	of	IPR	agreements	into	the	TRIPS	
agreement	and	by	making	 the	accession	 to	a	number	of	WIPO	 treaties	quasi	mandatory.	This	 led	 to	a	
hardening	 of	 WIPO’s	 soft	 law	 regime	 (see	 Shaffer	 and	 Pollack	 2010)	 and	 a	 shifting	 of	 regulatory	
boundaries	 across	 international	 organizations	 (Dupont	 and	 Elsig,	 forthcoming).	 However,	 the	 original	
fears	 that	 the	 TRIPS	 agreement	would	 lead	 to	 a	 flood	of	WTO	disputes	 did	 not	materialize	 (Pauwelyn	
2010)	 and	 beyond	 the	 demands	 to	 clarify	 the	 relationship	 between	 public	 health	 and	 TRIPS,	 the	
politicization	was	less	acute	than	anticipated	during	the	late	1990s.	
Today,	 IPRs	 have	 become	 an	 important	 feature	 of	 modern	 PTAs	 while	 the	 dialectical	 relationship	
between	PTAs	and	the	multilateral	system	remains	strong.	A	unique	element	of	the	TRIPS	agreement	is	
the	obligation	for	WTO	members	to	grant	concessions	agreed	 in	PTAs	to	all	WTO	members	not	 just	 to	
those	 that	 participate	 in	 a	 given	 PTA.	 This	 so-called	MFN	 clause	 ensures	 that	 non-PTA	members	 can	
benefit	 from	 WTO+	 types	 of	 protection	 for	 existing	 areas	 or	 new	 types	 of	 concessions.	 This	 clause	
provides	the	opportunity	for	an	indirect	multilateralization	of	preferential	deals	in	the	area	of	IPRs.	
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3. Existing	Work	on	IPRs	and	Trade	Agreements	
Given	 the	 importance	 of	 IPRs	 and	 the	 growing	 reliance	 on	 trade	 deals	 through	 preferential	
arrangements,	 it	 is	 surprising	 how	 little	 systematic	 research	 has	 been	 conducted	 in	 this	 area.	 While	
numerous	studies	exist	that	look	at	IPRs	in	trade	agreements,	few	of	these	take	a	systematic	approach;	
most	 follow	 a	 legal	 descriptive	 approach.	 Some	 studies	 have	 zoomed	 in	 on	 one	 particular	 trade	
agreement	and	have	either	compared	its	design	to	TRIPS	(see	Maskus	1997;	Kang	and	Stone	2003;	Price	
2003;	 Roffe	 2004)	 or	 focused	 on	 a	 specific	 IPR	 issue	 such	 as	 public	 health	 within	 a	 PTA	 (see	 Correa	
2004a).	 Other	 contributions	 have	 compared	 IPRs	 across	 multiple	 PTAs	 selecting	 one	 country	 or	 one	
region	(see	Abbott	2006;	Heath	and	Kamperman	Sanders	2007;	Lindstrom	2010;	Fink	2011).	Still	others	
examine	a	specific	issue	area	such	as	technical	assistance	in	PTAs	(see	Roffe	et	al.	2007)	or	analyze	IPRs	in	
Bilateral	 Investment	 Treaties	 (BITs)	 without	 accounting	 for	 corresponding	 commitments	 in	 PTAs	 (see	
Drahos	2001;	Correa	2004b;	Bernieri	2006;	Boie	2010).	
Seuba	 (2013)	 has	 prepared	 one	 of	 the	 most	 comprehensive	 studies	 and	 analyzed	 the	 intellectual	
property	content	of	141	PTAs.	His	case	selection	was	based	on	 the	WTO’s	Regional	Trade	Agreements	
Information-System	(RTA-IS)	and	include	only	PTAs,	which	have	some	form	of	IPR	protection.	The	paper	
provides	an	overview	of	the	occurrence	of	IPRs	in	PTAs,	looks	at	the	development	over	time,	compares	
treaties	 between	 the	 different	 types	 of	 pairs	 of	 countries	 (developed	 and	 developing	 countries),	 and	
differentiated	areas	of	IPR	enforcement	and	IPR	categories.	
Another	ambitious	project,	both	conceptually	and	descriptively,	has	been	the	result	of	work	carried	out	
by	the	WTO	Secretariat	(see	Valdés	and	Tavengwa	2012	resp.	Valdés	and	McCann	2014).	The	first	version	
of	 the	 study	 analyses	 194	 and	 the	 second	 version	 245	 trade	 agreements	 notified	 to	 the	 WTO,	 both	
papers	are	based	on	the	RTA-IS	database	as	well.	It	contains	an	extensive	dataset	on	general	IPR	content	
and	 scope	 of	 IPRs	 in	 PTAs	 understood	 as	 different	 forms	 of	 IPR	 areas	 such	 as	 copyrights,	 industrial	
designs	or	domain	names.	The	study	provides	a	highly	descriptive	and	informative	analysis	of	IPR	content	
variables	 across	 different	 regions	 and	 time,	 and	 compares	 networks	 of	 trade	 agreements	 with	 IPR	
provisions	over	time.	
Another	strand	of	research	that	has	been	conducted	aims	at	studying	the	origins	of	IPR	design	features.	
There	 is	 ample	 anecdotal	 evidence	 of	 negotiators	 engaging	 in	 copy-pasting.	 If	 we	 focus	 on	 TPP,	 for	
instance,	we	witness	that	much	of	the	content	has	been	drawn	from	other	treaties.	The	IPR	chapter	of	
TPP	 incorporates	 the	 Doha	 Declaration	 on	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 and	 Public	 Health,	 in	 which	 it	
emphasizes	once	more	that	TPP	Parties	can	take	measures	 to	protect	public	health.	The	same	chapter	
then	 borrows	 heavily	 from	 the	 failed	 ACTA	 treaty	 on	 counterfeit	 goods	 to	 address	 the	 challenges	 of	
trafficking	in	counterfeit	trademark	goods	and	pirated	copyright	goods.	Finally,	some	elements	are	new,	
such	 as	 the	 use	 IPR	 enforcement	 against	 infringement	 in	 newly	 regulated	 areas	 such	 as	 the	 digital	
environment,	including	products	and	services.	
Some	work	has	been	carried	out	to	study	this	phenomenon	more	systematically.	Allee	et	al.	(2016)	show	
in	 their	 work	 on	 how	 much	 WTO	 is	 present	 in	 PTAs	 that	 also	 in	 the	 area	 of	 IPRs	 exists	 significant	
presence.	 Over	 60%	 of	 IPR	 chapters	 in	 PTAs	 make	 references	 to	 the	WTO	 and	 these	 references	 are	
overwhelmingly	designed	to	build	coherence	with	the	TRIPS	agreement.	In	addition,	on	average	for	each	
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PTA	more	 than	10%	of	 text	 is	 lifted	directly	 from	the	TRIPS	agreement.	Also	 in	 separate	work	on	how	
PTAs	borrow	from	other	PTAs,	Allee	and	Elsig	(2015a)	show	that	on	average	77%	of	a	PTA’s	IPR	chapter	
copies	from	its	most	similar	PTA	that	was	concluded	in	the	past,	suggesting	substantial	copy-pasting	and	
close	connection	to	the	WTO	treaty	system.	
So	although	the	topic	of	IPRs	in	PTAs	has	attracted	some	attention	in	the	field	of	IR,	there	are	few	studies	
that	 study	 the	 phenomenon	 systematically.	 Most	 studies	 take	 a	 descriptive,	 legal	 approach	 and	
speculate	 about	 the	 policy	 implications.	 Another	 restriction	 of	 previous	 research	 on	 IPRs	 in	 PTAs	 has	
often	been	the	limited	number	of	cases	and	time	periods	analyzed,	or	the	predominant	focus	on	specific	
countries	and	actors	(very	popular	being	the	European	Union	and	the	United	States).	Our	paper	tries	to	
fill	 this	 apparent	 gap	 and	work	 towards	 presenting	 the	most	 extensive	 design	 data	 on	 IPRs	 and	 offer	
some	preliminary	findings	on	design	variation.	
	
4. Conceptualizing	and	Measuring	IPR	Provisions	
The	 literature	 on	 international	 institutions	 and	 agreements	 has	 developed	 different	 design	 concepts	
(Koremenos	et	al.	2001,	Abbott	et	al.	2000)	ranging	from	the	obligation	of	agreements	to	questions	of	
delegation	and	control,	as	well	as	flexibility	features	and	enforcement.	This	rich	literature	has	inspired	a	
set	 of	 studies	 on	 trade	 agreements	 on	 which	 we	 draw	 in	 elaborating	 our	 conceptualization	 and	
measurement	 (Kucik	 and	 Reinhardt	 2008,	 Pelc	 2009,	 Johns	 2014,	 Rosendorff	 2005,	 Baccini	 et	 al.	
forthcoming,	Allee	and	Elsig	2015b).		
The	 first	 concept,	 which	 we	 call	 DEGREE	 OF	 IPR	 PROTECTION,	 captures	 the	 overall	 IPR	 content	 and	
obligations	that	are	included	in	a	treaty	(see	Valdes	and	Tavengwa	2012;	Valdes	and	McCann	2014).	We	
code	elven	variables	 in	a	binary	fashion.	 In	order	to	be	coded	as	1,	the	 identified	 IPR	type	needs	more	
than	just	mentioning	or	reference,	but	specific	obligations	have	to	be	included.	We	do	at	this	stage	not	
define	this	variable	in	relation	to	WTO	commitments	(WTO	plus	or	WTO	minus).	Currently,	we	propose	a	
simple	aggregate	index	ranging	from	0	to	11.	Table	1	lists	the	components	that	go	into	this	measure:	
Table	1:	Degree	of	IPR	Protection	-	Index	
#	 Variable	Name	 Coding	Question	
1	 Copyrights,	Related	Rights	 Does	the	IPR	definition/chapter	include	specific	
commitments	on	copyrights	and/or	related	rights?	
2	 Trademarks	 Does	the	IPR	definition/chapter	include	specific	
commitments	on	trademarks?	
3	 Geographical	Indications	 Does	the	IPR	definition/chapter	include	specific	
commitments	on	geographical	indications?	
4	 Industrial	Designs	 Does	the	IPR	definition/chapter	include	specific	
commitments	on	industrial	design?	
5	 Patents	 Does	the	IPR	definition/chapter	include	specific	
commitments	on	patents?	
6	 Undisclosed	Information	
	
Does	the	IPR	definition/chapter	include	specific	
commitments	on	undisclosed	information	(including	
knowhow)?	
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7	 Layout	Designs	of	Integrated	Circuits	 Does	the	IPR	definition/chapter	include	specific	
commitments	on	layout-designs	(topographies)	of	integrated	
circuits?	
8	 New	Plant	Varieties	 Does	the	IPR	definition/chapter	include	specific	
commitments	on	new	plant	varieties?	
9	 Traditional	Knowledge,	Genetic	Resources	 Does	the	IPR	definition/chapter	include	specific	
commitments	on	traditional	knowledge	and/or	genetic	
resources?	
10	 Encrypted	Program-Carrying	Satellite	Signals	 Does	the	IPR	definition/chapter	include	specific	
commitments	on	encrypted	program-carrying	satellite	
signals?	
11	 Domain	Names	 Does	the	IPR	definition/chapter	include	specific	
commitments	on	domain	names?	
	
From	the	 literature,	we	know	that	the	overall	ambition	of	a	treaty	needs	to	be	analyzed	 in	connection	
with	 the	 availability	 and	 strength	 of	 enforcement	 tools	 (Downs	 et	 al.	 1996,	 Allee	 and	 Elsig	 2015b).	
Therefore,	we	introduce	as	second	concept	of	IPR	ENFORCEMENT.	This	measure	is	a	composite	variable	
focusing	on	11	 indicators	 that	 all	 individually	provide	greater	enforcement	possibilities.	 These	 refer	 to	
the	 availability	 of	 dispute	 settlement	mechanisms,	 direct	 border	 measures	 that	 can	 help	 combat	 the	
infringement	 of	 rights,	 the	 existence	 of	 administrative	 and/or	 criminal	 procedures,	 special	 liability	 for	
service	providers	as	well	as	the	institutionalization	(e.g.	through	joint	Committees)	to	help	and	enforce	
and	provide	more	transparency.	Table	2	lists	the	components	that	make	up	this	measure.		
Table	2:	IPR	Enforcement	-	Index	
#	 Variable	Name	 Coding	Question	
1	 General	Enforcement	Statement	 Is	there	a	general	statement	of	IPRs	enforcement?	
2	 Dispute	Settlement	Mechanism	 Is	 there	a	dispute	settlement	mechanism	directly	 related	 to	
IPRs?	
3	 Implementation	Provision	 Is	there	a	general	statement	of	IPRs	implementation?	
4	 Border	Measures	 Is	 there	a	general	 statement	of	border	measures	 related	 to	
IPRs?	
5	 Special	 Requirements	 Related	 to	 Border	
Measures	
Are	 there	 special	 requirements	 related	 to	 border	measures	
for	the	enforcement	of	IPRs?	
6	 Civil,	Administrative	Procedures,	Remedies	 Are	 there	 any	 civil	 and	 administrative	 procedures	 and	
remedies	defined	for	the	enforcement	of	IPRs?	
7	 Provisional	Measures	 Are	 there	 any	 provisional	 measures	 defined	 for	 the	
enforcement	of	IPRs?	
8	 Criminal	Procedures,	Remedies	 Are	there	any	criminal	procedures	and	remedies	defined	for	
the	enforcement	of	IPRs?	
9	 Service	Provider	Liability	 Is	 there	 a	 service	 provider	 liability	 defined	 for	 the	
enforcement	of	IPRs?	
10	 IPR	Committee	 Is	 there	 an	 IPR	 Committee	 monitoring	
implementation/enforcement/administration	of	IPRs?	
11	 Transparency	 Is	 there	a	 statement	of	Transparency	defined	 to	ensure	 the	
enforcement	of	IPR	protection?	
	
As	a	 third	 concept	we	suggest	 looking	at	 is	how	much	 the	 IPR	obligations	are	embedded	 in	 the	 larger	
network	of	WTO	and	WIPO	rules	and	regulations.	We	call	this	variable	MULTILATERAL	COHERENCE.	The	
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more	IPR	obligations	in	PTAs	incorporate	multilateral	principals	and	norms	and	advocate	the	adherence	
to	 established	 IPR	 treaties,	 the	 less	 fragmentation	 is	 created	 which	 would	 allow	 forum-shopping	
between	treaty	venues.	We	propose	two	distinct	measures	for	coherence.	The	first	measure	COHERENCE	
1	works	with	four	indicators:	First,	whether	national	treatment	and	MFN	(both	core	WTO	principles)	are	
explicitly	granted	to	the	PTA	partners	as	the	MFN	clause	further	strengthens	the	existing	MFN	obligation	
for	WTO	parties;	 second,	whether	 a	 re-affirmation	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 agreement	 is	 found;	 third,	whether	 a	
reaffirmation	of	 the	 core	WIPO	Convention	 is	 found;	 fourth,	whether	one	or	more	 reference	 to	WIPO	
treaties	 is	 included.	 The	 second	measure	 COHERENCE	 2	 captures	 the	 anchoring	 of	 IPRs	 in	 a	 broader	
network	 of	 IPR-related	multilateral	 treaties	 in	more	 detail	 by	 coding	 28	 IPR-related	 treaties	 that	 have	
been	 open	 for	 ratification.	 In	 appendix	 A,	 we	 list	 the	 treaties	 with	 year	 of	 creation.	 This	 index	 is	 an	
aggregate	index	ranging	from	0	to	28.	
	
5. Mapping	IPR	Provisions	
In	this	section	we	present	and	discuss	data	related	to	our	three	prime	categories	(degree	of	protection,	
enforcement,	multilateral	coherence).		
Figure	1:	Coverage	Over	Time	
	
	
Before	 discussing	 the	 patterns	 of	 IPR	 design	 in	 these	 areas,	 figure	 1	 above	 shows	when	 IPR	 contents	
started	to	appear	in	PTAs	and	when	specific	commitments	start	to	increase.	Until	1985	we	find	no	IPR-
related	 content	 in	 PTAs.	 The	 first	 trade	 agreement	 including	 IPR	was	 the	 FTA	 between	 Israel	 and	 the	
United	 States	 that	was	 signed	 and	 entered	 into	 force	 in	 1985.	 It	 contained	 one	 Article	 on	 IPR,	which	
granted	national	 treatment	 as	well	 as	MFN	 treatment	 and	mentioned	patents,	 copyrights,	 trademarks	
and	industrial	design	in	particular	but	didn’t	include	any	specific	obligations	(degree	of	protection).	After	
this,	IPRs	are	increasingly	included	in	PTAs,	both	general	statements	(from	35%	in	the	early	1990s	to	80%	
in	the	past	few	years).	The	percentage	of	including	specific	provision	beyond	the	mere	declaration	starts	
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to	increase	in	particular	the	past	5	years	(from	around	30%	to	75%).	This	suggests	that	especially	in	the	
past	10	years	more	and	more	IPR	content	is	covered	in	PTAs.	
If	we	 focus	on	 the	 types	of	 IPRs	 that	have	been	 subject	 to	 inclusion	 into	PTAs	 (figure	2),	we	 find	 that	
copyrights,	 trademarks,	 geographical	 indications,	 industrial	 design	 and	 patents	 to	 be	 the	 dominating	
types	of	 IPR	 rights.	More	 recently	and	 less	often	we	 find	 references	 to	new	plant	varieties,	 traditional	
knowledge	or	domain	names.	So	the	PTAs	map	pretty	closely	onto	WTO	obligations	on	the	first	group	of	
rights.	
Figure	2:	Types	of	IPR	Coverage	
	
Figure	3:	IPR	Protection	and	Membership	Characeristics	
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Turning	to	our	 first	concept	that	measures	the	degree	of	obligation,	 figure	3	above	shows	the	average	
degree	 of	 IPR	 protection	 across	membership	 characteristics.	 If	we	 focus	 on	 regions,	 Americas	 has	 the	
highest	amount	of	IPR	protection	compared	to	other	regions.	Intra-European	PTAs	and	intra-Asian	PTAs	
have	substantially	lower	protection,	while	African	PTAs	lack	IPR	protection.	Intercontinental	agreements	
are	 generally	more	 recent	 and	also	 show	higher	 levels	of	 IPR	protection.	Not	 surprisingly	North-South	
agreements	are	those	much	higher	IPR	protection	than	both	North-North	and	South-South	treaties.	This	
pattern	 is	 suggestive	 that	North	partners	 in	PTAs	push	 for	greater	 legal	 certainty	about	 IPR	protection	
and	make	it	(analogous	to	the	WTO	Uruguay	Round	negotiations)	a	condition	for	greater	market	access.	
The	data	also	shows	that	PTAs	including	the	US	have	the	greatest	obligation	in	terms	of	IPRs	by	far.	The	
EU	compared	as	well	as	the	group	of	leading	economies	(the	G20)	have	significantly	lower	IPR	content.	
When	we	take	a	closer	look	at	the	US,	the	EU	and	the	G20	(figure	4),	we	observe	that	in	the	case	of	the	
US	WTO	established	 IPRs	make	 the	bulk	of	 specific	 commitments	 (copyright,	 trademarks,	geographical	
indications	and	patents)	but	also	newer	areas	such	as	encrypted	program-carrying	satellite	signals	and	
internet	domain	names.	For	both	G20	and	the	EU	there	is	less	variation	across	issue	areas.	
Figure	4:	IPR	Protection:	G20,	US	and	EU	Compared	
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Figure	5:	IPR	Enforcement	and	Membership	Characteristics	
	
Figure	6:	IPR	Enforcement:	G20,	US	and	EU	Compared	
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those	 with	 the	 highest	 inclusion	 of	 WTO	 principles	 and	 re-affirmations	 of	 WTO	 and	 WIPO	 regimes	
(general	multilateral	 coherence	measure).	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 direct	 inclusion	 of	 IP-related	 treaties	 to	 be	
acceded	it	is	noteworthy	that	intra-European	PTAs	are	more	likely	to	include	these	than	American,	Asian	
and	 African	 treaties.	 Very	 significant	 again	 are	 the	 differences	 when	 we	 focus	 on	 North-South	
agreements	in	relation	to	the	other	categories.	Finally,	PTAs	involving	the	US	involve	more	commitment	
both	for	general	and	specific	coherence	with	the	multilateral	system	than	PTAs	involving	the	EU	or	G20	
countries.	
Figure	7:	Multilateral	Coherence	and	Membership	Characteristics	
	
	
Finally,	we	look	at	the	development	of	the	different	indexes	over	time.	As	shown	in	figure	8	all	indexes	
show	a	clear	 increase	over	time.	For	 the	degree	of	protection	we	can	see	that	beginning	 in	the	period	
2005-2009	 on	 average	 at	 least	 one	 specific	 IPR	 obligation	 (1.2)	 was	 included	 per	 PTA.	 The	 IPR	
enforcement	 index	 shows	 that	already	5	years	earlier	 (2000-2004)	an	average	PTA	already	 included	at	
least	one	provision	on	enforcement	(1.4).	Looking	at	the	multilateral	coherence	we	see	that	beginning	in	
2000-2004	average	PTAs	included	at	least	some	form	of	general	coherence	provisions	(Coherence	1,	1.3)	
and	 included	 already	 in	 1990-1994	 reaffirmation	 or	 accession	 provisions	 to	 at	 least	 one	 IPR-related	
multilateral	agreement	(Coherence	2,	1.0).1	
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Figure	8:	Coverage	Over	Time	-	Indexes	
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transplanted.	The	diffusion	literature	provides	us	with	theoretical	guidance	and	will	locate	causal	drivers	
of	exports	and	imports	of	design.	
Finally,	 with	 these	 data	 at	 hand,	 we	 might	 be	 able	 to	 better	 address	 some	 questions	 related	 to	 the	
impact	of	PTA	obligations;	most	of	 the	work	 in	 the	past	has	used	dummy	variables	on	 IPR	presence	 in	
PTAs	to	estimate	trade	and	investment	effects.	Given	more	nuanced	data,	we	might	inform	this	debate	
further	and	address	both	economic	and	political-institutional	effects.	
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Appendix	A	
#	 Coding	Question	 Treaty	Description	 Classification	
1	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	Rome	Convention?	
International	 Convention	 for	 the	 Protection	
of	Performers,	Producers	of	Phonograms	and	
Broadcasting	Organizations	(1961)	
WIPO	 IP	 Protection	
Agreements	
2	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	Paris	Convention?	
Paris	 Convention	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	
Industrial	 Property	 (as	 amended	 on	
September	28,	1979)	
WIPO	 IP	 Protection	
Agreements	
3	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	Bern	Convention?	
Berne	 Convention	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	
Literary	 and	 Artistic	Works	 (as	 amended	 on	
September	28,	1979)	
WIPO	 IP	 Protection	
Agreements	
4	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	WCT?	
WIPO	Copyright	Treaty	(WCT)	(1996)	 WIPO	 IP	 Protection	
Agreements	
5	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	WPPT?	
WIPO	Performances	and	Phonograms	Treaty	
(WPPT)	(1996)	
WIPO	 IP	 Protection	
Agreements	
6	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	 the	 Convention	 for	 the	
Protection	 of	 Producers	 of	
Phonograms	 Against	
Unauthorized	Duplication	of	Their	
Phonograms?	
Convention	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	 Producers	
of	 Phonograms	 Against	 Unauthorized	
Duplication	 of	 Their	 Phonograms	 (1971),	
Geneva	
WIPO	 IP	 Protection	
Agreements	
7	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	Beijing	Treaty?	
Beijing	 Treaty	 on	 Audiovisual	 Performances	
(2012)	
WIPO	 IP	 Protection	
Agreements	
8	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	Singapore	Treaty?	
Singapore	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Law	 of	 Trademarks	
(2006)	
WIPO	 IP	 Protection	
Agreements	
9	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	TLT?	
Trademark	Law	Treaty	(TLT)	(1994)	 WIPO	 IP	 Protection	
Agreements	
10	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	PLT?	
Patent	Law	Treaty	(2000)	 WIPO	 IP	 Protection	
Agreements	
11	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	Brussels	Convention?	
Brussels	 Convention	 Relating	 to	 the	
Distribution	 of	 Programme-Carrying	 Signals	
Transmitted	by	Satellite	(1974)	
WIPO	 IP	 Protection	
Agreements	
12	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	Nairobi	Treaty?	
Nairobi	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Protection	 of	 the	
Olympic	Symbol	(1981)	
WIPO	 IP	 Protection	
Agreements	
13	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	Budapest	Treaty?	
Budapest	 Treaty	 on	 the	 International	
Recognition	 of	 the	 Deposit	 of	 Micro-
organisms	 for	 the	 Purposes	 of	 Patent	
Procedure	 (as	 amended	 on	 September	 26,	
1980)	
WIPO	Global	Protection	
System	
14	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	Hague	Agreement?	
Hague	 Agreement	 Concerning	 the	
International	 Registration	 of	 Industrial	
Designs	(1925)	
WIPO	Global	Protection	
System	
15	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	Lisbon	Agreement?	
Lisbon	 Agreement	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	
Appellations	of	Origin	and	their	International	
Registration	 (as	 amended	 on	 September	 28,	
1979)	
WIPO	Global	Protection	
System	
16	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	Madrid	Agreement?	
Madrid	 Agreement	 Concerning	 the	
International	 Registration	 of	 Marks	 (as	
amended	on	September	28,	1979)	
WIPO	Global	Protection	
System	
17	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	 the	 Protocol	 of	 the	 Madrid	
Agreement?	
Protocol	 Relating	 to	 the	 Madrid	 Agreement	
Concerning	 the	 International	 Registration	 of	
Marks	(as	amended	on	November	12,	2007)	
WIPO	Global	Protection	
System	
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18	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	PCT?	
Patent	Cooperation	Treaty	(PCT)	(as	modified	
on	October	3,	2001)	
WIPO	Global	Protection	
System	
19	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	Nice	Agreement?	
Nice	Agreement	Concerning	the	International	
Classification	 of	 Goods	 and	 Services	 for	 the	
Purposes	 of	 the	 Registration	 of	 Marks	 (as	
amended	on	September	28,	1979)	
WIPO	Classification	
20	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	Strasbourg	Agreement?	
Strasbourg	 Agreement	 Concerning	 the	
International	 Patent	 Classification	 (as	
amended	on	September	28,	1979)	
WIPO	Classification	
21	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	Vienna	Agreement?	
Vienna	 Agreement	 Establishing	 an	
International	 Classification	 of	 the	 Figurative	
Elements	of	Marks	 (as	 amended	on	October	
1,	1985)	
WIPO	Classification	
22	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	Locarno	Agreement?	
Locarno	 Agreement	 Establishing	 an	
International	 Classification	 for	 Industrial	
Designs	 (as	 amended	 on	 September	 28,	
1979)	
WIPO	Classification	
23	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	UPOV?	
International	 Convention	 for	 the	 Protection	
of	New	Varieties	of	Plants	(UPOV)	
Multilateral	
Agreements	
24	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	IPPC?	
International	 Plant	 Protection	 Convention	
(1951)	
Multilateral	
Agreements	
25	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	CBD?	
Convention	 on	 Biological	 Diversity	 (CBD)	
(1992)	
Multilateral	
Agreements	
26	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	UCC	(Geneva,	1952)?	
Universal	 Copyright	 Convention	 of	 6	
September	 1952,	with	 Appendix	 Declaration	
relating	 to	 Article	 XVII	 and	 Resolution	
concerning	Article	XI,	Geneva	
Multilateral	
Agreements	
27	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	UCC	(Paris,	1971)?	
Universal	Copyright	Convention	as	revised	on	
24	 July	 1971,	 with	 Appendix	 Declaration	
relating	 to	 Article	 XVII	 and	 Resolution	
concerning	Article	XI,	Paris	
Multilateral	
Agreements	
28	 Does	the	treaty	affirm	(accession)	
to	the	UDRP?	
Uniform	 Domain	 Name	 Dispute	 Resolution	
Policy	(1999)	
Multilateral	
Agreements	
	
	
	
